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4ABSTRACT
This paper examines the evolution of the institution of ‘Welfare
Funds’ for informal sector workers in the State of Kerala in India.  The
Kerala experience, which is now thirty years old, reflects what the workers
in the informal sector could achieve in countries like India given the
contemporary political context and the democratic political framework
of the State.  But it required sustained collective action on the part of the
workers.  The paper finds that while the Welfare Fund Model of collective
care arrangements for the informal sector workers in Kerala showed
considerable innovation in its design and organisation, its functioning
is embedded in the bureaucratic system giving rise to a number of
problems.  Even then the Model offers a minimum of social security to
the informal sector workers who are unprotected.  Therefore the question
of replicating this Model with suitable modifications to other States in
India as well as to other countries, where there are no social security
arrangements for informal sector workers, is worth pursuing.
JEL Classification : I 30, I 38,  J 50
Key words : collective care, informal sector workers, Kerala, social
security, welfare funds.
5Introduction
Mutually beneficial collective care arrangements by workers to
take care of risks and uncertainties are not unknown in labour history.
But they were by and large arrangements not only for the workers but
also by the workers, hence called mutual benefit societies or friendly
societies.  Such mutual benefit societies were quite prominent in the
lives of the working class right from the early phase of industrialisation
in the present day industrially advanced countries (see e.g., van der
Linden 1996).  The emergence of such mutual benefit societies was
indeed a reflection of the collective response to the insecurity and
vulnerability experienced by the working class at a time when neither
the employers nor the state came forward to address those issues.  Workers’
mutualism was also a prominent feature of the early mobilisation of the
labouring poor in Kerala.  These were quite minimal but were expressions
of a high degree of solidarity.  Mutual help was extended during times
of death, marriage, strikes and extreme economic hardships.  Such initial
acts of mutualism later on helped in the design and articulation of
institutional forms of social security for the workers in the informal
sector, both in rural and urban areas.
The Welfare Fund model of social security for informal sector
workers in Kerala is now more than 30 years old.  It started with the
formation of a Welfare Fund for the toddy tappers in 1969.  The Kerala
approach reflects what the workers in the informal sector could achieve
in countries like India given the contemporary political context and the
6democratic political framework of the state.  But it required sustained
collective action on the part of the workers.  This precondition had
already been achieved in Kerala.  For that reason, the collective care
arrangements in the form of Welfare Funds were constituted with the
active participation of the state.  In fact the state played and continues
to play the leading role in the initiation and management of the Welfare
Funds.  The organised workers, through their unions, articulate their
demands and exert pressure on the state government.  The employers
are, by and large, unwilling but co-operating partners since the larger
political context and the political economy of power relations do not
provide them with the choice to opt out of such arrangements.  Their
participation is therefore a pragmatic one within the framework of their
economic rationality for accumulation.
To begin with, the establishment of collective care arrangements
in the form of Welfare Funds was not high in the agenda either of the
workers’ unions or of the political parties to which they are affiliated.  A
nuance reading of the politics of labour suggests that welfare
arrangements were quite low in their agenda.  It was the limitations of
radical political mobilisation of labour in the context of a pluralist and
electoral democratic polity that forced the political unions to search for
solutions for employment and livelihood vulnerability.  In that sense,
the constitution of Welfare Funds was not even a second-best solution
but a third-best one.  This calls for some clarification.
Trade unions emerged as a powerful labour institution in Kerala
over a long period of time.  Historical factors played an important role in
this development.  These were the early proletarianisation of a large
segment of the traditional labour force, the social reform movements for
attaining social dignity for the poor and those considered socially
backward, nationalist politics accompanied by a radical political
7movement which explicitly incorporated all sections of the labouring
poor and organised them in trade unions.  The context has been referred
to as a “historical conjuncture” (for details, see Kannan 1988).  This
development was indeed a watershed in the evolution of labour markets,
as it exists today, in Kerala.  Within a short span of time it was instrumental
in the erosion of traditional labour relations as embodied in patron-
client relationships and the inter-linkage between land, labour and credit
markets.  Labour relations increasingly became formal, impersonal and
contractual.  Yet they retained the basic characteristic of stratification
and segmentation embedded in the traditional social order.  The former
relates to the hierarchy of occupations depending on the nature of the
job, earnings and security and the latter would refer to the boundaries
existing within a given stratum of the labour market.  The main sources
of these features seem to lie in the institution of caste (reflecting social
stratification) and gender considerations manifested in the vulnerable
position of women workers.  In a situation of high unemployment, the
strategies of labour unions, dictated by short-term considerations, seem
to have strengthened the segmentation characteristics by falling back
on caste and/or gender considerations. This is related to their strategy of
maximising earnings of the ‘insiders’ by controlling entry into the labour
market.  However the objective situation in Kerala was such that there
was only a small segment of the economy which could approximate to
capitalist enterprises and therefore to a classical type of capital-labour
relations.  Given the strong anti-capitalist ideology and the strategy of
peasant-worker alliance, all situations characterised by relations of
labour exploitation were considered appropriate for unionisation.  This
logic was further reinforced in the context of competitive populism
when, in the sixties and seventies, political parties in Kerala had to
fiercely contest for gaining political power through elections.  What the
Congress Socialists and later Communists once initiated became the
8‘model’ for all political parties, most of them offshoots of either the
Congress Party or the Communist Party.  Thus an overwhelming
proportion of workers in the informal/unorganised sector was organised
in unions.
However, trade unions found it difficult to approximate the
situation in the unorganised sector to that of the modern industrial
sector.  Yet the historical experience of organisation of workers was that
of the industrial model.  While the political ideology was to fight
capitalism (in non-agricultural employment) and was stressing the
ideology of socialism, the operational part of trade union functioning
was to improve the conditions of work, earnings and the economic
security of workers.  A close reading of trade union functioning in Kerala
suggests that the model before them was that of modern industrial
employment characterised by higher wage rates, stable employment,
better working conditions, non-wage benefits and long term economic
security.  In brief, the objective was to improve the ‘labour status’ and
income.  In our interpretation this would imply a movement away from
vulnerability towards stability in employment and income.  The ultimate
objective may be construed as a position equivalent to that in, what is
referred to in the standard literature, the primary labour market.  In
pursuing this model, almost relentlessly, the unions have succeeded to
a remarkable extent in breaking down the conventional differences
between the organised and unorganised or formal and informal sectors,
and in its place given rise to another labour market phenomenon of
‘insiders’ vs. ‘outsiders’.  Here the notion of insider denotes primarily
union membership with or without stable employment.  In the process a
number of labour institutions, borrowed from the ‘industrial relations
model’ were transplanted into the realm of informal sector workers.  These
were  Minimum Wage  Committees and Industrial Relations Committees.
What was not in the ‘industrial relations model’ but introduced for the
9informal sector workers were the labour co-operatives and collective
care arrangements in the form of Welfare Funds.  However, the relative
failure of the labour co-operatives in terms of economic viability (with
a few honourable exceptions) to take care of employment and social
security requirements of the workers gave rise to the setting up of Welfare
Funds.
In situations of stable employment, the above strategy of
improving conditions of work and wages would generate real increases
in earnings and other benefits.  But that was not the case with most
sectors, including “factory” type employment in such industries as coir
weaving and cashew processing.  Unions were faced with the most
difficult of situations with regard to retaining, let alone expanding,
employment for existing workers.  This ‘forced’ the unions to resort to
two options considered feasible in the prevailing circumstances.  One
was the demand, directed at the state, for setting up labour cooperatives,
and the other was to adopt a closed shop strategy with regard to labour
market entry.
The major labour cooperatives in Kerala are those of toddy tappers
(now defunct), beedi workers, handloom weavers, coir processing workers
and cane and bamboo workers, and a few groups of casual labourers in
loading and unloading work.  These were set up in response to the
demand by the unions, and they did not have (nor did they seek to
develop it subsequently) managerial and even organisational capabilities
(beyond recruiting members) so crucially needed to sustain cooperatives
within the prevailing competitive market framework.  This was because
the cooperatives were thought of as a defensive strategy in times of
crisis, mainly responding to threats to the employment of existing
workers.
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The closed shop strategy of unions was to protect the employment
of its members.  However, it created a situation of exclusion of those
workers who were unable to get into the unions and thus to the labour
market.  This was because unions control entry into many labour markets
in Kerala. Examples are that of headload work, cashew factory work,
toddy tapping, public works, and coconut climbing.  As a result union
membership has become the primary criterion for occupational identity
for purposes of eligibility in social security arrangements such as
receiving a state pension and/or membership in a Welfare Fund.
The Emergence of Welfare Funds
It is in this background that we need to understand the emergence
of Welfare Funds as a specific form of collective care arrangement for
the workers in the informal sector.  The first-best solution in the context
of radical political mobilisation was, of course, a revolution in favour of
the working class.  That was the initial motivation for the mobilisation
of labour by Congress Socialists and later by Communist Party workers.
With the attainment of independence by the country and the
establishment of a parliamentary democracy, this initial objective gave
way to protecting and enhancing workers’ rights and their share of
earnings.  Hence the second-best solution in terms of organising workers
for higher wages, non-wage benefits and improved working conditions.
In Kerala this also reached its limits quite early given the very slow pace
of modern industrialisation and the concomittant expansion of the
organised sector.  In such labour intensive manufacturing and related
activities as coir processing and manufacturing, the strategy of pushing
for higher earnings led to its logical consequence of technological
changes.  However, the political unions, in their eagerness to protect
current employment, fiercely opposed technological changes, often in
a Luddite fashion.  This happened in one of the most labour intensive
activities in agriculture as well – rice cultivation.  This led to migration
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of industries to other regions in India and in rice cultivation to shifting
of the land to less labour intensive cultivation.  By mid-seventies the
limitations of militant political unionism began to clash with the
developmental imperatives of a low income agrarian economy.  Given
the highly articulate nature of workers, thanks to the earlier four decades
of political mobilisation, the political parties realised the need for some
form of institutionalised forms of welfare arrangements lest they lose
the support of the labouring poor.  The chronology of the establishment
of Welfare Funds lends credence to this argument.  Only one Welfare
Fund was established in the sixties and that too in 1969 under special
circumstances.  This was for the Toddy Tappers who were one of the
early radicalised sections of the rural workers.  The establishment of the
Welfare Fund was a consequence of the limitations of wage bargaining
at the end of which the employers chose to leave the business.  A take
over of production and distribution of the toddy through a workers’
cooperative did not go much forward.  It was in this background the
Toddy Tappers Welfare Fund was set up with the active intervention of
the government, then led by one of the two communist parties, the
Communist Party of India.  There was no intention at that time to extend
this form of collective care to other sections of workers in the informal
sector for almost a decade.  However, in 1977 another Welfare Fund
known as the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund was set up for workers in
small scale factories, plantations, shops and cooperative institutions.
The political perception changed drastically by the early eighties.  The
seventies witnessed a fierce contestation in unionising the hitherto non-
unionised workers in the informal sector as a result of the split in the
trade union – the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) - led by the
undivided Communist Party of India.  This led to the proliferation of
unions along party lines led by not only the three main parties –
Communist Party of India, the breakaway Communist Party of India
(Marxist) and the Indian National Congress (I) which also witnessed a
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split in 1969 – but many regional parties.  Thus during the eighties nine
Welfare Funds were set up covering workers in such diverse occupations
as loading and unloading (known as head-load workers), motor transport,
clerks working with legal advocates, artisans, fish workers and hand
loom workers.  To this should also be added such groups as cashew and
coir processing workers dominated by women.  Given the wide political
acceptance of this form of collective care arrangement under the initiative
of the state, the process continued in the nineties with the setting up of
another seven Welfare Funds.  The list of Welfare Funds so far set up is
given in Table 1.  Such a list is impressive not only in its numbers but
also in the coverage of diverse groups of workers in the informal sector,
a phenomenon we think is likely to be a rare one in the contemporary
developing countries.
At the core of this form of collective care arrangement was the
spirit of mutualism i.e., taking care of individual risks through collective
contributions and providing some social security at the end of the
working life.  Unlike the historical experience of workers in the advanced
industrial societies of today, this arrangement did not stop with the
mutualism among workers.  Given the political nature of workers’
mobilisation and the existence of a democratic state, the arrangement
was an institutional innovation by bringing in the participation and
contribution of employers, however defined, and the organisational
support (sometimes financial contributions) of the government.  Thus
these Welfare Funds offer some form of social security at the end of the
working life, social insurance in the event of sickness, accident and/or
death and a measure of welfare arrangements in the form of assistance
for housing, education of children and marriage of daughters.  In certain
cases where the Welfare Funds are not in a position to provide old age
pension, the state came out directly to provide such pensions from the
budget (see Kannan 2001).
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Table 1: Welfare Funds, Beneficiaries and Source of Financing
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
(1)  (KTWWF 1969)
Kerala Toddy Workers
Welfare Fund (S)
(2) (KLWF, 1977)
Kerala Labour Welfare
Fund (S)
(3) (KHEDLWWF, 1983)
Kerala Head load Workers
Welfare Fund (S)
Toddy workers are defined as any person who is directly
or indirectly in the production (tapping), collection and
distribution of toddy for his livelihood.  All toddy shops/
premises are covered under the Act (Fund).
Government : Nil
Employer :
13 % of workers wage
Employee :
8 % of workers wage
Workers in factories, plantations employing 10
employees and above, shops and commercial
establishments employing two and above and co-
operative institutions employing 20 workers and
above are covered by the Fund.
Government :
Vary year to year. So far Rs. 40 lakhs
have been allotted.
Employer :
Rs. 8 per half year per worker
Employee :
Rs. 4 per half year per worker
A ‘Head load Worker’ is defined as an individual
who works for an establishment either directly or
through a contractor for wages, in loading, unloading,
carrying on head or in a trolley, any article from any
place.  But this does not include a person engaged by
an individual for domestic purposes.
Government : Nil
Employer:
25 % of the workers’ wage
(including gratuity 5%)
Employee: * 10 % of wage **
For general fund.
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(4) (KMOTWWF, 1985)
Kerala Motor Transport
Workers Welfare Fund (S)
(5) (KADCLWF, 1985)
Kerala Advocate Clerk
Welfare Fund (NS)
(6) (KARSWWF, 1986)
 Kerala Artisans and Skilled
 Workers Welfare Fund (NS)
Name of the fund
Year of starting       Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
A person who is employed for wages in a motor
transport undertaking directly or through an agency to
work in a professional capacity on a transport vehicle,
like driver, conductor, cleaner, station staff, checking
staff, cash clerk, time keeper, watchman or attender.  An
employee becomes eligible for membership on
completion of three months of service.
Government: Nil
Employer:
13 % of the workers’ wage
Employee: 8 % of the workers’ wage
A person who functions as an Advocate Clerk,
registered under the Kerala Advocate Clerk Welfare Act
who is within the age limit of 20 and 70 are eligible for
membership in this scheme.
Government: Rs. 90 per year per member
Employer: Nil
Employee:
Rs. 60 per annum per member
Workers in the informal sector such as Tree Climbers,
Gold Smiths, Carpenters, Shoe Makers, Beedi Makers,
Potters, Chakku Oil Extractors, Cycle Rickshaw
Workers, Gunny Bag Collectors, Cycle Repairers, Watch
Repairers, Milk and News Paper Distributors,
Ice Makers, Milk Extractors, Photographers, Tailors,
Barbers, Dhobies and also all other workers who are
 not covered by any of the welfare schemes in the state,
within the age limit of 20 and 58 are eligible for
membership in this scheme
Government:
Rs. 2 per every Rs. 10 contributed by
the worker
Employer: Nil
Employee:
Rs 10 per month per worker
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Name of the fund
Year of starting       Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
(7) (KCSHWWF, 1988)
Kerala Cashew Workers
Relief and Welfare Fund(S)
A cashew worker is any person who is engaged in
any form of employment in the processing of
cashew.  The scheme applies to cashew workers and
their dependants (husband/wife, unmarried
daughters and minor sons and parents, minor
brothers and unmarried sisters, fully dependant on
the beneficiaries).  He/she is eligible for welfare
benefits of the Fund, provided he/she is  resident of
the state., with a minimum of five years in the
industry, annual income not exceeding Rs. 3600 and
is not covered by ESI/Maternity Benefit Scheme
Government:
Twice the amount contributed by the
employer
Employer:
Rs. 1 per worker per working day
Employee:
50 ps per worker per working day
(8) (KKHWWF, 1989)
  Kerala Khadi Workers
  Welfare Fund (S)
The workers who are employed for wages under
employers, contractors, in  co-operative or self-
employed for subsistence in Khadi industries are
eligible to be a member of the Scheme.
Government: 10 % of workers' wage
Employer:
10 % of workers’ wage
Employee:
10 % of workers’ wage
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(9) (KCORWWF, 1989)
  Kerala Coir Workers
  Welfare Fund (S)
Coir worker is any person who is employed for
wages to do any work in connection with the
various processess in the coir industry and who
gets his wages directly or indirectly from the
employer, dealer or producer of coir products.
This will include contractors or agents and anyone
who depends mainly on the coir industry for his
livelihood and any person employed in coir
industry (self employed).  The Scheme also
covers their dependants.
Name of the fund
Year of starting       Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
Government:
Grant which is twice the amount contributed by
the workers
Employer:
* 1% of the turnover.
* Co-operative society Rs. 1 per month per
worker and others Rs. 2 per month per worker
Employee:
Rs. 1 per month per worker
(10) (KFMWF, 1989)
   Kerala Fishermen
  Welfare  Fund (S)
It covers all fishermen who are employed for
wages in a fishing vessel or self employed
fishermen who are registered as members of
Fishermen’s Welfare Society.
Government:
Contribution for pension and group insurance
premium
Employer:
*  Dealer 1% of the turn over.
* Vessel owner Rs. 1 to Rs. 7 per month for nine
month.
* Net owner Rs. 1 per month,
* Farm owners 2 % of value of fish caught
Employee:
* 3% of value of fish caught or 3 % of wage.
* And Rs. 30 per worker per year
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Name of the fund
Year of starting       Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
Any person who is engaged in any activity related to
Handloom Industry and who gets his/her wages
directly or indirectly from the employer or contractor
and all others who depend mainly on the Handloom
industry for his/her livelihood are included (self
employed).  The scheme also covers their
dependents.
(11) (KHNDLWWF, 1989)
    Kerala Handloom Workers
     Welfare Fund (S)
Government:
Twice the workers’ and self-employers’
contribution
Employer:
* 1% of annual turn over and an amount equal
to workers contribution
Employee:
* Rs. 1 per month
* Rs. 2 per month by self-employers
Abkari workers are Arrack - Foreign Liquor
workers who are not covered by the Toddy
Workers Welfare Fund.
Government:
Rs. One lakh for pension purpose (1994-95)
Employer:
15% of workers’ wage (including 5% gratuity)
Employee:
10% of the workers’ wage
(12) (KABWWF, 1990)
     Kerala Abkari Workers
     Welfare Fund (S)
(13) (KCONWWF, 1990)
  Kerala Construction
  Workers Welfare Fund  (S)
The scheme extends to two homogeneous
categories of workers, namely (a) the Construction
Workers (workers employed in any construction
such as masons, carpenters, bricklayers, excluding
supervisory functionaries like Engineers etc) and
(b) Quarry Workers (workers engaged in quarrying
including stone-crushing, but not including
supervisors)
Government:
10 % of initial member’s contribution per annum
Employer:
* 1% of the construction cost
* Yearly contribution made by the contractors
(Rs. 100 to Rs.1000)
Employee:
Monthly contribution per member-slabs Rs.
10, Rs. 15 and Rs. 25
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(14) (KAGWWF, 1990)
  Kerala Agricultural
  Workers Welfare Fund  (S)
Name of the fund
Year of starting       Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
All Agricultural Workers who are engaged in the
agriculture operation within the age limit of 18-60
years and are covered by the Kerala Agricultural
Workers Act 1974 are eligible to obtain welfare
benefits of the fund.
Government: Nil
Employer:
Land Owners’ contributions are 0.5-1 hector:
Rs. 10 per year and others (>1h.) Rs.15
Employee:
Rs. 2 per month per worker
(15) (KLOTAWF, 1991)
     Kerala State Lottery Agents
   Welfare Fund (NS)
Lottery Agent: A person who is a regular agent
and holds a valid identity folder as mentioned in
Kerala State Lottery Rules 1977
Government:
20% of the members’ contribution
Employer: Nil
Employee:
Category A/B Rs. 15 / 10 per month
(16) (KDSVWF, 1991) Kerala
  Document Writers, Scribes
     and Stamp Vendors
     Welfare Fund (NS)
A person who functions as a Document Writer or
as a Scribe or Stamp Vendor and is licensed under
the Kerala Document Writer’s (Licence Rules) or
the Kerala Manufacture and Sale Stamp Rule
1960).  Membership is open to any person holding
a valid licence and aged below 60 years.
Government:
10% of the members’ contribution
Employer: Nil
Employee:
Category A/B Rs. 15 / 10 per month
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Name of the fund
Year of starting       Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions                Sources of finance
(17) (KAURWWF, 1991)
        Kerala Auto Rickshaw
       Workers Welfare Fund  (S)
An autorikshaw worker means a person employed
directly or indirectly or by himself through
ownership (self employed) of the vehicle (auto
rickshaw) in a professional capacity (either a
goods carrier or passenger carrier).  The scheme is
voluntary and the workers within the age group of
28 to 58 are eligible to join the Scheme.
Government:
10 % of the workers’ contribution
Employer:
Rs. 10 per month per worker
Employee:
Rs. 20 per month per worker
(18) (KAWHWF, 1991)
        Kerala Anganwadi
     Workers &
        Helpers Welfare
        Fund (NS)
Persons who are working in Anganwadi (Day
Care centre  like health workers, teachers and
helpers are expected to be covered by this Fund.
Government: (Employer)
10% of the members’ contribution
Employee:
Worker Rs 20 per month and Helper Rs. 10
per month
(19) (KTAWWF, 1994)
        Kerala Tailors Welfare
     Fund (S)
Tailors are defined as any person who is directly or
indirectly employed by employers, contractors,
agents or by himself through ownership of tailoring
shops.
Government:
10 % of the workers’ contribution
Employer:
Rs. 5 per month per worker
Employee :
Rs. 10 per worker and Rs. 15 per self-
employee per month
Note: S refers to Statutory bodies and NS to Non Statutory bodies
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Although there is a similarity in the nature of benefits offered,
there are some variations as to the emphasis and the magnitude of such
assistance.  These are not without importance or consequence and we
will discuss them later in this paper.
The Model
As we mentioned earlier, the Welfare Fund arrangement is
modelled after the social security and insurance cover arrangements
available to the workers in the formal sector.  Within the limited financial
capacity, these Funds have also conceived of some measure of welfare
provisioning.  The underlying model has the following characteristics:
(i) providing a measure of social security, insurance and welfare
assistance to the workers;
(ii) creation of a tripartite body consisting of the representatives of
the workers, employers and the government with veto powers for
the government on policy issues;
(iii) a bureaucratic organisational mode with the chief executive
appointed by the government and staff drawn from the
government departments;
(iv) mandatory financial contribution from the workers and employers
with the exception of a few ‘voluntary’ funds; and
(v) minimal financial contribution by the government except in cases
where the workers are directly under the government activities
(i.e. government as employer) or where paying capacity of the
workers is deemed very low.
The initiative for setting up a Welfare Fund usually comes through
a political process wherein the political parties and their unions make a
public demand for it.  Since labour relations have come to occupy a
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central stage in the politics of the state and consequently on public
policy, there exists a remarkable degree of political consensus on the
setting up of Welfare Funds as in the case of collective bargaining.
Given the emergence of party-affiliated trade unions in almost all
occupations, all political parties, big and small, have come to see the
Welfare Funds as an opportunity to extend their political patronage and
concern for the workers.  The political consensus has often taken the
shape of competitive populism given the enthusiasm with which political
parties belonging to the two major coalitions have gone about setting
up Welfare Funds for workers.  The existence of such a political consensus
has made it easy for a government to introduce legislation on the creation
of a particular Welfare Fund.  The legislative discussion would often
centre on the details of the constitution, definition of workers, financial
contribution by workers, employers and the government and related
aspects.
Once the legislature comes out with an enactment, the executive
wing of the government (in this case the Department of Labour) would
set up a tripartite body consisting of the representatives of the workers,
employers and the government.  Workers’ representation is usually in
the form of nomination of the leaders of the main unions active in a
particular occupational group.  Given the political consensus and the
alternation of one or the other political coalition in government,
representation is usually ensured to the main unions irrespective of
their political affiliation.  This is a remarkable feature of
institutionalisation of labour politics in Kerala where no particular party
can have a dominating presence either in government or in trade unions.
Over time this system of nomination has taken the character of open
political patronage to trade union leaders by their political bosses.  Most
of them are ‘professional union leaders’ who may or may not have a
background of work in the concerned occupation.  If such nominations
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have taken the character of ‘rent seeking behaviour’ it is not an isolated
one.  It should be seen as part of the larger system of ‘political rent
seeking’ that has contributed much to the decline in ‘self-less’ service
characteristic of politics of an earlier era compared to the ‘self-centred’
and ‘sectional-interest oriented’ politics in recent times.
Employers’ representation is also through nominations either of
the employers’ organisations or prominent employers in a given
occupation.  Since employers as a group have accepted the institution
of collective bargaining and care arrangements through Welfare Funds,
their participation is more out of necessity than out of a conscious
policy.  They also ensure that such participation is used to articulate
their views and grievances.
Nomination of government representatives is often done
bureaucratically with little concern for assessing the nominees’ expertise
and interest.  The concerned officials of the Labour Department and
Finance Department are the usual nominees.  Others may belong to
departments that look after the industry or occupation.  The Chief
Executive is usually a senior government official on deputation from a
department.
The administrative support system is the organisational form of
the Welfare Fund.  Employees from government departments staff the
system.
During the legislative process, one of the most debated aspects of
the Welfare Funds is the definition of ‘worker’ who will be covered by
the arrangement.  This is not only due to the multiple nature of the jobs
often performed by workers but also by the overlapping nature of some
Welfare  Funds.  Through systematic union intervention, the labour
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market for the informal sector in Kerala gives very little scope for a
worker to practice multiple jobs once he/she becomes a union member.
In fact this is one of the strategies of the unions to create a closed shop
model and a strict occupational identity.  However, often workers in one
occupation may find eligible for more than one Welfare Fund.  For
example, masons and carpenters come under the definition of
construction workers but they are allowed to register under the Artisans
and Skilled Workers Welfare Fund.  Such anomalies are gradually getting
eliminated as unions keep a watchful eye on the definition of the worker
and the eligibility for registration in a particular Welfare Fund.  Since
the definitional aspect of who is considered a worker in these informal
sector activities is quite important, especially for other states in India or
countries outside, we have given in Table 1 the official definitions used
for various Welfare Fund legislations in Kerala.
Contributions
An important aspect of the Welfare Fund formation is in fixing the
contributions of the workers, employers and in some cases of the
government itself.  Table 1 also gives details of the contribution of the
stakeholders.  However, we could not discern any underlying principle
for the determination of their financial contributions.  During informal
discussions, we came across the argument of differential capacity to pay
but we doubt whether this principle will stand the test of a careful scrutiny.
In the section on Critical Assessment we shall deal with the economic
and political factors in the determination of the contributions.  Suffice it
here to say that contributions vary widely as between occupations and
groups of workers.  This is not only for the workers but also for the
employers and that of the government.  Out of the 19 Welfare Funds set
up so far, the government contributes directly to 15 of them. Here again
there is no well-stated principle underlying such a consideration.  In
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some cases where there is no contribution, it should however be
mentioned that government pays a state pension (old age) for such
workers as in the case of agricultural labourers.  The contribution of the
employers has run into certain legal difficulties.  While in some cases,
the contributions are regularly collected, in some others the employers
are unwilling to pay the contribution and have questioned it in the
court of law.  Economic factors are a key to understanding the differential
behaviour.  Wherever the product market allows the employer to shift
the burden to the consumer, there have been less resistance in paying
their contributions. On the other hand, in product markets where the
employers are price takers such as in the marine export market, rice
market, etc. the unwillingness has been open and the policy challenged
legally.
Administration
Since administration of the Funds is with the government, they
are like the departments of the government in terms of their style of
functioning.  The considerable innovative skills evident in the designing
and coverage of the Funds are however not deployed in the administrative
set up.  Therefore the administrative form hardly gives any flexibility or
room for innovation according to the requirements of each Fund.
Members to the Boards of Directors are nominated by the government
and the representation is more or less equal from all three sides i.e.,
unions, employers and government. Although the Boards of Directors
are the ultimate body for deciding the policies and functioning of the
Funds, the concerned government department wields considerable power
of veto through a system of ‘sanctions’.  For example, the annual reports
and accounts have to be sent to the government for sanction (approval).
Further, prior permission is required for revision of rates of contributions
and benefits to the workers.  Given that the Chief Executive Officer is a
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government employee, the day-to-day effective control also rests with
the government.
The establishment expenses are borne out of the income of the
respective Funds.  Here again the Boards of Directors do not seem to
have any effective control.  The fees and allowances payable to board
members, salaries and other benefits to the administrative staff, routine
administrative expenses including equipment, travel etc., contribution
to provident funds of the staff are all borne by the income of the Fund.
Thus, ironically a part of the contributions of the informal sector workers
go to take care of the cost of maintaining the secure jobs of the
government employees.   We were given to understand that not more
than ten percent of the total income of a given Fund is supposed to be
spent as establishment charges (i.e. administrative cost). However, only
7 out of 16 Funds considered (as in 1992-93) are found to have conformed
to this ceiling (see Table 3). However, it must be noted that the absolute
amounts are on the higher side when compared to the amount disbursed
as benefits to the members.  This fact alone point to the strange fact that
the savings of the informal sector workers is used to maintain the
employment and income of the formal sector workers in government
service.  This is an important aspect of the working of the Welfare Funds
that calls for closer scrutiny and periodic monitoring by the government
to ensure that administrative expenses are kept to the minimum.
Coverage
An important yardstick of the effectiveness of the Welfare Funds
would be their coverage.  It must however be pointed out that the
estimation of coverage poses some important methodological problems
as there are no reliable estimates of the number of workers in each
occupational group. The estimates given in the census reports can be a
reliable source but this applies to only a few categories of workers such
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as agricultural labourers, fish workers, construction workers who are in
the informal sector and have been given separate occupational
classification.  For a number of occupations, workers are clubbed in
such broad category as workers in food processing (that would include
cashew workers and toddy tappers).  However, the concerned government
departments seem to have come out with some estimates of total workers
and these could be used to work out the coverage ratio on the basis of
the members enrolled in each Fund.  Table 2 shows the estimated total
workers and the workers enrolled in each Welfare Fund.  Out of the 19
Funds for which data are available (18 Funds implemented by the
Government of Kerala and the one for Beedi and Cigar workers by the
Government of India), three Funds show coverage of above ninety
percent, one having cent per cent coverage.  Another five shows between
fifty and ninety percent.  If we include the Welfare Funds for Khadi
workers and agricultural labourers who are close to 50 percent coverage,
the average coverage of these 11 Funds works out to 58 per cent.  For the
remaining eight, the coverage ranges from 6 to 32 per cent.  We believe
that the lower coverage in some may be due to the very high estimates of
the number of total workers.  For example, the estimated number of total
workers for ‘artisans and skilled workers’ group is 40 lakhs that would
work out to nearly one-third of the total workers in Kerala!  The fact that
some of the artisanal and skilled workers belong to other Welfare Funds
might also have contributed to the reported low coverage.  For example,
handloom weavers would be legitimately been treated as ‘artisans’ and
yet they would not belong to this Fund, as there is a separate Fund for
them (KHNDLWF).  Similarly workers engaged in traditional fishing are
also treated as artisans but they have also a separate Fund.  The same is
the case with such workers as carpenters and masons (who would belong
to the Fund for construction workers).  The Kerala Labour Welfare Fund
(KLWF) also comprises workers from a number of occupations and
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Table 2.  The Coverage Ratio (realised) by various Welfare Funds
Sl. Name Estimated Workers Coverage
No. Workers as on covered as on  Ratio
March 1994   March 1994 (%)
1 KAWHWF 20,000 20,000 100
2 KTWWF 45,000 44,991 99.9
3 KCSHWRWF 1,31,000 1,23,699 94.4
4 KABWWF 15,000 13,800 92.0
5 KFMWF 2,40,000 1,97,129 82.1
6 KDSWF 4,000 3,255 81.4
7 KLWF 6,00,000 4,22,000 70.3
8 KCONWWF 5,00,000 2,85,000 57.0
9 KADCLWF 5,000 2,569 51.4
10 KAGWWF 20,00,000 9,61,000 48.1
11 KKHWWF 26,840 12,293 45.8
12 KLOTAWF 10,000 3,242 32.4
13 KMOTWWF 1,26,474 31,329 24.8
14 KCORWWF 3,84,000 72,908 19.0
15 KHNDLWF 2,50,000 26,000 10.4
16 Beedi & Cigar
Workers WF 2,50,000 25,520 10.2
17 KAUTRWWF 77,875 5,052 6.5
18 KHEDLWWF 2,00,000 11,077 5.5
19           Total 48,85,000 22,60,864 46.3
20 KARSWWF 40,00,000* 3,25,000 8.1
Note:  * This seems to be a highly inflated figure as it works out to one-
third of the total workforce in Kerala. Many artisan groups have separate
Welfare Funds and hence this estimate calls for closer scrutiny. We have
therefore kept this Fund out of our calculation of the coverage ratio.
Source:  Various Departments of the Government of Kerala and the
administrative reports of Welfare Funds.
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establishments such as those working in shops and other commercial
establishments, small factories, plantations, motor repair workshops and
co-operative societies. The definition of worker for this Welfare Fund is
not only defined so broadly but also intended as a residual category for
workers who do not belong to any of the other Funds.  Recent
developments have shown that this Fund is losing its importance since
one of the main group of workers – tailors – have been successful in
getting a new Welfare Fund established for them in 1994.  Similar
overestimation is also likely in the case of head load workers. For these
reasons, the reported coverage ratio is likely to be an underestimate.
Even while keeping the above limitation in mind, it needs to be
pointed out that the enrolment of workers in a given Fund is a function
of the attractiveness of the expected benefits.  In that respect, some of
the Funds do not seem to attract the workers.  These are particularly so in
the case of autorickshaw workers and handloom workers.  In the case of
head-load workers, the estimate refers to their total number in the state
as a whole whereas the Welfare Fund coverage is limited to urban markets
only.
Benefits From the Funds
As stated earlier, the Funds are meant to provide a measure of
social security and insurance for workers who are vulnerable to risks
and uncertainties and do not have any other institutional protection
arising from their employment status.  To this basic objective, almost all
Funds have also provided a measure of welfare assistance to workers in
which housing and education appear as the most prominent ones.  In
Appendix 1 we have compiled the social security, insurance and welfare
benefits of individual Funds.  Social security benefits are mainly in the
form of a provident fund that will be given to the worker on
superannuation, a monthly pension (only 8 Funds), and payment of a
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gratuity (also in selected cases only).  Social insurance is in the form of
an ex-gratia payment in the event of disability or death and a modest
payment in the event of treatment for ill health.  Welfare assistance
consists of financial assistance for housing, education of children, and
marriage of daughters.  Given the importance of education in Kerala and
the premium attached to it even by the poorer households, it should not
come as a surprise that educational assistance figures in the welfare
benefits of a number of Funds.  A notable provisioning by the Funds
which is neither an ‘insurance’ nor a ‘welfare’ is the financial assistance
for meeting the funeral expenses of the worker.  This may sound amusing
in a context where birth and death are usually a kinship/community
responsibility.  However, from the point of labour history, this is hardly
amusing.  For, in the European context one of the most prominent
assistance of mutual benefit societies was that of meeting funeral
expenses.  As van der Linden (1996) points out, although the worker
often worked without dignity, the need for conducting his funeral in
dignity was underlined by this form of assistance.  Here the contemporary
Kerala mutualism among workers resembles so closely to that of the
western historical experience that reminds one of certain core concerns
of labour regarding human dignity.   The benefits of the various Funds
are briefly discussed below.
(i)  Provident Fund:  Only three Funds – toddy tappers, motor
workers and abkari (workers in liquor shops) workers – provide for a
provident fund.  In the case of toddy tappers both workers and employers
contribute to the provident fund whereas in the case of motor workers
the contribution of workers are repaid with interest.  For abkari workers
the net credit on retirement is used for financing a monthly pension. The
workers in these three categories are all male and as such hardly any
female workers in the informal sector enjoy this benefit.
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(ii) Gratuity:  In the formal sector the provision of gratuity is in
the form of a lump sum payment, calculated as a share of the earnings of
the workers by taking into account the number of years, in the form of a
final payment as a gratuitous reward.  This form of social security for old
age has been incorporated in eight out of the 19 Funds set up so far.
Toddy tappers, head load workers, workers in liquor shops (called abkari
workers), autorickshaw drivers, document (legal) writers, advocate clerks
and agricultural workers are provided with this benefit.  Here again one
should note that, with the exception of agricultural workers that include
women, all others include only male workers.  The inclusion of
agricultural labourers should be seen in the light of the inability of the
government to implement the Agricultural Workers Act and hence as a
relief to this section of workers.  Moreover, the Fund for agricultural
labourers hardly provide for any other benefit.  Taken together, the
provision for a provident fund and a gratuity payment covers only 10
out of the 18 Funds.  Toddy tappers alone enjoy both the benefits.
(iii)  Monthly Pension:  This is incorporated in eight Funds.
However, it should be kept in mind that agricultural labourers, who
constitute the single largest group in the work force, receive an old age
pension directly from the state.
(iv)   Disability and Accident Cover: The concern for disability/
death arising out of accidents has been so strong that all the Funds
have provided for some cover.  However, the relatively politically
influential sections of workers have provided for a monthly pension
in the event of permanent disability.  In all others it is a lump sum ex-
gratia payment from the Fund except in the case of fishworkers who, in
addition to an ex-gratia, also have a group insurance cover.  There is
no uniformity in the payment of ex-gratia.  What seem to weigh is the
political profile of the workers and the status of the work performed.
31
The lowest ex-gratia is in the case of the agricultural labourers who, of
course, contribute their labour to the basic productive sector of the
economy but usually find themselves at the lower end of social security
arrangements.
  (v)  Health cover:  There is no formal insurance cover provided
to the workers. It is usually in the form of reimbursement of a part of the
expenses incurred for medical treatment.  Only 10 Funds (out of 17)
provide for some financial assistance in the event of treatment for illness
and/or accident.  Those who enjoy this benefit are toddy tappers, head-
load workers, workers in small scale factories and shops, motor workers,
artisans and skilled workers, khadi workers, coir workers, fish workers,
handloom workers and construction workers.  Here again the excluded
category includes agricultural labourers.  Coir workers seem to have an
edge over others in the sense that the health cover is extended to all
members of the family whereas it is applicable to only the worker in
other cases.
(vi)  Unemployment relief: Given the vulnerability of informal
sector workers in terms of the absence of reliable and regular employment,
one would have thought that assistance during periods of unemployment
would have been a priority for the Welfare Funds.  But this is not the
case.  Only four groups of workers have this benefit.  In the case of fish
workers, it is provided in the form of thrift collected during the peak
season and distributed during the lean season of fishing.  The low priority
attached to unemployment assistance reflects the low political priority
attached to this problem in Kerala.  The politics of labour has assigned
a very high priority to the rights, entitlements and security of the workers
whereas those who are unemployed have not received much political
attention.  This bias seems to have been carried through even while
designing collective welfare schemes.
32
(vii)  Educational assistance:  A majority of Funds have provided
for this assistance, 13 out of 17. These are usually for the education of
the children.  A number of Funds have instituted incentives for children
who do well in their education.
  (viii)  Housing assistance:  The relatively powerful groups of
workers such as toddy tappers, head-load workers, workers in liquor
shops and construction workers have this benefit.  To this should be
added the handloom weavers who are not economically powerful as the
above but seem to enjoy political backing.  For the majority of workers
there is no provision for housing assistance.  However, there are several
housing schemes for the poor in Kerala that this aspect of social security
has been quite seriously addressed as part of the state government’s
poverty alleviation programmes (see Kannan 2001).
(ix)  Marriage assistance: The parents of the daughters usually
incur marriage expenses.  Since this has become an important social
custom with obligations to spend for the wedding function, this is an
important responsibility of the households involving lump sum
expenditure.  Here again the coverage is only partial with nine out of 17
having this benefit.
(x)  Funeral expenses: As we mentioned before funeral assistance
has figured in most of the Welfare Funds. However five of them do not
have any provision for it.
A Critical Assessment
Before we comment critically on the functioning of the Welfare
Funds it must be stated at the outset that this model of providing a
modicum of social security for the workers in the informal sector has
been a remarkable one.  Kerala now has an accumulated experience of
implementing this model for more than three decades.  In this respect,
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Kerala has been a pioneer in the Indian context in incorporating social
security for the poor in public policy. The Welfare Fund model should
be seen in this larger context as complementary to the basic social
security provided by the state.  The coverage of occupations in the
informal sector has been quite wide although coverage in terms of workers
has a significant gap, if not a wide one.  Given the nature of employment
in informal sector and its geographical spread, the coverage of workers
should be reckoned as impressive, if not complete.  The Welfare Funds
now cover workers in the informal sector both in agriculture and non-
agricultural occupations, cutting across rural-urban and gender
differences.  These Funds have sought to address the concerns of social
security, insurance and welfare albeit in the minimalist sense.  Along
with the universalistic and basic social security programmes (such as
food security, access to school education and primary health care), the
State-assisted social security programmes in Kerala have imparted a
sense of dignity and self-esteem to the workers in the informal sector.
The contribution of the labour movement and the pro-poor state policies
laid the foundations for the evolution of such a broad-spectrum social
security arrangement.
Having recognised the importance and achievements of Kerala,
we must also point out to certain fundamental weaknesses.  The structural
characteristics of a low income agrarian economy still operates in Kerala
as a constraint in enhancing the scope and benefits of the social security
arrangements in general and the Welfare Funds in particular.  Although
the growth performance of the Kerala economy in the nineties has
recovered to around 6.5 percent per annum, the low level of per capita
income, as with the rest of the Indian economy, continues to be a fact of
life.  This constraint can be overcome only through a higher rate of
investment and the structural transformation of the economy.  In particular,
the low labour productivity in agriculture and industry has to be tackled.
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The prospect for enhancing investment is there – thanks to the continuing
flow of remittances by Keralites working in the Gulf countries – but the
infrastructure bottlenecks as well as an earlier negative image continue
as major constraints (see Kannan 2002).  The latter one is being overcome
with some success but the problems of inefficiency in the management
of the infrastructure sector is proving to be a formidable one.
However, these larger constraints cannot be used as an excuse for
some of the weaknesses in the functioning of the Welfare Funds.  There
are several issues of policy and performance that can be improved upon
with a view to enhancing the benefits to the workers in the informal
sector.  A select list of such issues, which we think are important, is
discussed here.
Differential Benefits and Ability to Pay: A perusal of the criteria
for contributions as well as benefits shows wide variations as between
the different Funds.  While absolute amounts in contributions may vary,
there is no reason why rates of contributions should vary from one to the
other.  Similarly the benefits also show wide variations.  The justification
given for the latter is that the ability to pay differs from one occupation
to another.  This may well be so but there is need for some uniformity in
the type of benefits.  For example, the social security components could
comprise provident fund, gratuity and a monthly pension (wherever the
workers are not covered by a state pension).  The social insurance
component should take care of compensation for ill health, accident
and death.  These two types of benefits could have been incorporated in
all Welfare Funds as common benefits.  Welfare benefits could be
according to the ability to pay.  There is therefore need for a rethinking
on this aspect of the designing of Welfare Fund benefits.  In those Welfare
Funds where the ability to pay is the least there is a need for financial
assistance from the state.  This aspect has been tacitly recognised by the
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Kerala government because the State makes contributions to those  Funds
where the total contribution from the employers and workers has been
insufficient to meet the stipulated benefits.  Examples in this respect are
the Fishermen’s Welfare Fund, the Coir Workers Welfare Fund and the
Handloom Workers Welfare Fund.  There is however a need for evaluating
the need for government contributions and the actual collection of
contributions (efficiency criterion) as against the ability to pay of workers
(equity criterion).
Collecting Contributions from Employers: Employers in Kerala
have been contributing to the different Welfare Boards not out of
philanthropy or concern for his fellow countrymen who are his workers,
but because this has become a statutory requirement in most cases. The
general hostility towards working class is evident in the agricultural
sector where the legislation for a Welfare Board has been challenged at
each stage in civil courts since 1974. In the fisheries sector, exporters
resorted to a two-week strike in the year 2000 against a one-percent levy
on their turnover towards the Welfare fund.  There are some Welfare
Funds (5 out of 17) in 1992-93 (as given in Table 3) that are struggling
to find economic viability due to lack of co-operation from the
employers.
Coverage of Workers: The fact that on the whole about one-half
of the workers in the informal sector of the state have been brought
under one or another welfare fund till 1995 shows that significant number
of workers are now enrolled in the Welfare Funds. This percentage
however refers to the 18 Welfare Funds and the estimated total number
of workers in those occupations.  We have left out the Kerala Labour
Welfare Fund because of the overestimation of the workers. The total
number of workers enrolled in the Welfare Funds comes to around 26
lakhs in Kerala. This is quite impressive.  The other side of the picture,
36Table 3. Mobilisation and Use of Funds under various Welfare Funds (1992-93) (Rs. Lakhs)
Note : Figures in the bracket show the amount as the percentage of total contribution
NA: Not Applicable
Saving or Dis-
saving  (+ or -)
Employer-Worker
contribution
Government
contribution
Total
contribution
Investment as on 31st
March 1995
+12.6 (+12.7) 996.12 - 996.16 (100) 15656.84
-5.98 (-23.1) 24.34 - 24.34 (100) 105.46
+1607.4 (+84.4) 1906.47 - 1906.5 (100) 1448.26
+142.83 (+70.4) 203.02 - 203.02 (100) 1560.67
+2.21 (+61.7) 1.43 2.15 3.58 (100) NA
+397.17 (+90.2) 366.96 73.40 440.36 (100) 1135
+128.23 (+58) 161.00 60.00 221.00 (100) 559.2
+190.94 (+94) 124.14 79.00 203.14 (100) 175.3
-17.61 (-24) 58.4 15.00 73.4 (100) 554.74
+28.9 (+7) 97.43 297.32 394.75 (100) 134.5
-8.46 (-39.6) 12.35 9.00 21.35 (100) 20
+786.2 (+95.2) 825.52 - 825.52 (100) 3852
+335 (+69) 487.38 - 448.38 2135
+144.75 (+78.6) 184.04 - 184.04 (100) 321.21
NA 9.91 NA NA NA
-3.64 (-29.4) 9.9 2.5 12.4 (100) NA
-0.51 (-3.3) 14.21 1.42 15.63 (100) 65
3854.56 (64) 5483 540 6023 (100) 27733.18
SL
No.
Name Pension Gratuity
 Retirement     
benefit
Other social
insurance 
program
1 KTWWF 598.2 (60) 163.1(16.4)
2 KLWF - 12.13 (49.8)
3 KHEDLWWF 16.21 (0.9) 160.72 (8.4)
4 KMOTWWF 23.5 (11.6) 0.29 (0.1)
5 KADCLWF 0.46 (12.8) 0.28 (7.8)
6 KARSWWF 3.54 (0.8) 28.96 (6.6)
7 KCSHWWF 41.1 (18.6) 31.18 (14.1)
8 KKHWWF 0.06 (0.02) -
9 KCORWWRF 70.7 (96.4) 8.59 (11.7)
10 KFMWF 278.9 (70.6) 36.79 (10.7)
11 KHNDLWWF 15.0 (70.3) 0.41 (1.9)
12 KABWWF - 4.19 (0.15)
13 KCONWWF 70 (0.3) 79.9 (16.4)
14 KAGWWF - 3.29 (1.8)
15 KLOTWWF 0.25 1.70
16 KDSVWF - 0.6 (4.8)
17 KAUTRWWF - 0.40 (2.6)
Total 1051 (17.4) 533.26 (8.8)tal
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however, is that a majority of the workers in the informal sector of the
economy as a whole are out of the Welfare Funds.  As per the 1991
Census Kerala ’s Worker Participation Rate (WPR) is 38 percent and this
worked out to a total number of 120 lakh workers.  Around 12 lakhs are
in the organised sector and this gives a figure of around 108 lakhs in the
informal sector. If we leave out the category of farmers (who are landed
and classified as ‘cultivators’ in the census), the workers in the informal
sector work out to around 90 lakhs.  Given coverage of 26 lakhs this
works out to a coverage ratio of around 29 per cent. The lower coverage
ratio in some Welfare Funds is due to their non-statutory status and as
such membership is on a voluntary basis. There is also a likelihood that
some of the Welfare Funds’ schemes and benefits are not attractive enough
to canvas more workers, e.g., Kerala Lottery Agents Welfare Fund and
the Kerala Document Writers, Scribes and Stamp Vendors Welfare Fund.
Mobilisation of Funds and Its Management:  On the basis of the
available figures (for 1995) we find that around 70 percent of the Funds
mobilise resources that exceed their total expenditure.  However, there
are wide variations in the proportion of the contribution spent on
distributing benefits to the members.  This varies from less than one
percent in the case of khadi workers and abkari workers and about two
percent in the case of agricultural labourers and lottery agents to 108
percent in the case of coir workers (see Table 3). It should be stressed
that the low share is found among the most important section of informal
sector workers i.e. agricultural labourers.  The others in this category are
khadi workers, abkari workers (workers in the country liquor shops),
lottery agents, document writers and autorickshaw drivers. Given the
high share of women in the agricultural labourers, the least beneficial
group in terms of gender is the women workers.   Most Funds have also
accumulated significant amounts in investments.  The highest is the
Toddy Tappers Welfare Fund, which has been in existence since 1969
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followed by the Funds for the liquor shop workers, construction workers,
motor transport workers and head-load workers.  As in 1995 the
outstanding investment comes to around Rs.277 crores.  Clearly there is
need for evaluating the investment of each Fund, their collections and
disbursements to the members.  The low share of disbursements in some
Funds is a matter of concern since this hardly provides any meaningful
social security for the members.  The fact that the disbursements do not
reflect either the contributions or the accumulated funds could give rise
to problems of credibility in the long run.  It also implies that the present
generation of workers may be benefiting at the cost of past generations.
Clearly these tendencies are not desirable for the Funds, given that their
proclaimed aim is to cater to the welfare of workers.  It can also lead to
the credibility of the Funds being in jeopardy as the contributors may
accuse that the Funds are not being used for the welfare of the workers.
Cost of Administration: Though it has been generally accepted
that the administrative cost of each Fund should not exceed 10% of the
total income of the respective Fund; nearly half of them are operating
above this stipulated amount. The main reason for this state of affairs is
that each of the 19 Welfare funds in the state has its own separate and
independent administrative bodies, thus multiplying the total overhead
costs. From Table 3 it becomes clear that some of the welfare boards are
operating at such high administrative cost that they raise basic questions
on the motive behind running welfare funds. The share of administrative
expenses in total income varies from 1.24% in the case of KDSVWF to
as much as 73.3% in the case of KLWF and 67.4% in KHNDLWWF.
Instead of calculating the administrative cost as a percentage of
total income, a far more relevant ratio is to express it as a percentage of
the total welfare payments – a sort of transaction cost of welfare
distribution. If this cost exceeds the benefit transferred, certainly the
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scheme involves undesirable implications. This is given in Table 4 for
1992-93.  Unfortunately 8 out of the 17 Welfare Funds show that the
administrative cost exceeds the total welfare payments (i.e. above 100
percent).  In some it shows such ludicrous figures.  For example, in the
Khadi Workers Welfare Fund the administrative cost is 200 times (20,000
percent) that of the welfare payment; in the Agricultural Workers Welfare
Fund it was 11 times (1094 percent) and in Document Scribes and Vendors
Welfare Fund it was 26 times (2573 percent).  In reality what this means
is that there is very little by way of welfare payments despite collection
of contributions from the stakeholders.  These Funds seem to function
to serve the interests of the bureaucracy entrusted to manage them.
These Funds, it must be pointed out, are a bloat on the fair name of the
Welfare Fund model of social security arrangement for the workers in
the informal sector in Kerala.
 This is yet another irony of a system that was established to
serve the interests of the workers in that it has ultimately turned out to
be an exercise in self-serving for the bureaucratic interests.  However,
a unified and common administrative body to cater to all the Welfare
Funds need not necessarily be a solution to the problem. This is because
of the possible conflict of interest as between different groups of workers
with differential ability to pay on the one hand and employers with
different occupational interests to protect on the other.  There is also
the danger of giving rise to a monolithic bureaucracy that could become
less sensitive to the requirements of the worker members.  This calls
for a careful evaluation of the administrative arrangement keeping in
view the need for participation by the workers and employers and
responsive to their specific needs and problems.  Periodic monitoring
and performance evaluation of the Welfare Funds by independent
agencies could be thought of as a possible answer to the current
problems.
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Table   4:  Administrative expenses of the Welfare Funds as   percentage
of total welfare payments, 1992-93
Name of the Welfare Fund %
Kerala Khadi Worker’s Welfare Fund (KKWWF) 20000
Kerala Document Scribes & Vendors Welfare Fund (KDSVWF) 2573
Kerala Lottery Workers Welfare Fund (KLOTWWF) 1101
Kerala Agricultural Workers Welfare Fund (KAGWWF) 1094
Kerala Abkari Worker’s Welfare Fund (KABWWF) 839
Kerala Autorickshaw Workers Welfare Fund (KAUTRWWF) 382
Motor Transport Worker’s Welfare Fund (KMOTWWF) 153
Kerala Labour Welfare Fund (KLWF) 147
Kerala Handloom Worker’s Welfare Fund (KHNDLWWF) 93
Kerala Advocate Clerks Welfare Fund (KADCLWF) 85
Kerala Head Load Worker’s Welfare Fund (KHEDLWWF) 69
Kerala Construction Worker’s Welfare Fund (KCONWWF) 45
All Schemes Average 37
Kerala Artisans & Skilled Workers Welfare Fund (KARSWWF) 33
Kerala Cashew Worker’s Welfare Fund (KCSHWWF) 28
Kerala Fishermen’s  Welfare Fund (KFMWF) 16
Kerala Coir Worker’s Welfare Fund (KCORWWF) 15
Kerala Toddy Taper’s Welfare Fund (KTWWF) 14
Source: Calculated from Table 3.
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Gender Equity:  Another important aspect which we notice when
we go through the profiles of the  Welfare Funds is that it is precisely the
Funds created for the relatively weaker sections among the workforce
and sectors which are predominated by women that are still struggling
for financial viability (e.g. cashew, handloom, coir) whereas the more
powerful and vociferous male sections of the workers seem to have
ensured a better deal for themselves. (e.g. toddy,  head-load and
autorickshaw workers). It is equally true that it is precisely for these
more vociferous and militant sections that the more diverse schemes as
well as higher economic benefits are provided for in the Welfare Funds.
(e.g. Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund and Head-load Workers Welfare
Fund - See Appendix 1).The fact is that even now women’s issues seem
to be not at the centre stage of debate and policy even in Kerala when it
comes to their participation and problems in the labour market.  This is
in sharp contrast to their achievements in social development as in
controlling the birth rate, enhancing literacy and schooling, life
expectancy and so on.  Even ‘progressive’ political parties who ought to
begin this change also seem disinclined to encourage women to be the
leaders, prompting them or relegating them to be only one among many
leaders under their control.
Some Larger Issues: An important feature that we observe in the
welfare scenario in Kerala is that the patronage relations that once existed
has now been replaced by political patronage of the working class and
the poor by major political parties.  Though political parties favouring
their vote banks is not a new phenomenon, the scale and brazenness of
its manifestation giving rise to competitive populism may be reaching
alarming proportions.  This does not augur well either for the poor or for
the society at large as such tendencies could lead to the degeneration of
the system and the civil society in the long run. Given the ‘bandwagon’
effect seen commonly in many other fields, almost all smaller political
parties too emulate this kind of patronage relations.
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It may also be noted that in some Welfare Funds the contribution
by government as well as employers have been stipulated as a function
of and provisional to employees’ contribution, which has, compromised
the very financial viability of the scheme.  That is, since the employee’s
contribution is set at a low level the contribution by the other two
stakeholders too has been relatively small affecting the very viability of
the scheme (e.g., advocate clerks welfare fund, handloom welfare fund,
artisan and skilled workers welfare fund).
Since Welfare Funds are constituted on an occupational basis, the
entry to and exit from the labour market tends to be controlled by unions
since recruitment of membership is primarily routed through unions.
Since a new entrant to the market implies additional economic burden
to the employers, they collude with the existing employees to avoid
this additional burden.  At least in the case of some of the Welfare Funds
the constitution of a Welfare Board in a particular segment has resulted
in the existence of a segment of workers who are ‘unregistered’ and
hence do not obtain any benefits of the Fund.   This once again brings to
the fore the irony of the ‘insider-outsider’ problem in the functioning of
trade unions.
It is also to be noted that those Welfare Funds, which have
successfully ensured the contribution of the employers, are the ones,
which ensured economic viability. Instances of this can be found in
Construction Workers Welfare Fund (KCONWWF), which ensured
economic contribution from the employers by stipulating that the plan
for any construction activity would be sanctioned only if the employer
or contractor paid 1% of the total construction cost to the Welfare Fund
in advance.  Another instance is the Abkari Workers Welfare Fund
(KABWWF), which too has a single and effective point of collection of
contribution of employers.
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The ever-increasing demand for more and more Welfare  Funds for
each and every sub-sector of the informal sector can only be viewed as
a desperate reaction of the workers for a measure of social security in an
unprotected labour market.  Given a long history of mobilisation and
organisation and pro-poor policies of the governments in power, the
working and living conditions of an average worker in the informal/
unorganised sector in Kerala is perceptibly better than that of two/three
decades ago. As a result, the scenario  of abysmal sub-human poverty
evident in most parts of India are now a rare phenomenon in Kerala.
However, one of the biggest challenges facing Kerala remains i.e. the
problem of unemployment.  This is closely related to the nature and
pace of growth and structural transformation of the Kerala economy.
This throws up issues beyond the scope of this paper.  Suffice it to say
that the recent recovery in economic growth has not been adequate to
confront the problem of unemployment seriously.  Further challenges in
the form of liberalisation of the Indian economy have also emerged in a
powerful way.  Reducing unemployment and enhancing the social
security cover to the majority of the people are two crucial issues that a
liberalised economy will have to face.  The Welfare Fund model of
Kerala provides some useful pointers to alleviating the problem of
insecurity among the workers in the informal sector.
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Appendix 1:  Welfare Fund Benefits
Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability,      Children’s’
the Fund  Death      Education
A pension
scheme has
recently been
evolved  and it
offers Rs. 100
per month to
retirees who
has up to ten
years member-
ship and also
offers an
additional
amount of Rs.
10 per month
of every year
that comes
after the 10th
year at the
Fund.
Net credit to the
account of the
worker
(provident fund
a/c) and gratuity
paid with
interest
(currently 11%)
onsuperannuation,
retirement or on
his death.
Gratuity is 50%
of the monthly
average of
wages for each
completed year
of service
subject to
maximum of 20
month’s wages.
Disability
allowance
Rs:125 per
month.  Funeral
expense Rs.
2,000.
Non refundable
advance
(deductible) from
his contribution
Rs. 1200 or 50%
of his
contribution,
whichever is
lower.
KLWF No
provision.
Since the Fund
is an Insurance
Fund, there is
no retirement
benefit.
Ex-gratia Rs.
1000,
Permanent
disabled Rs.
2500, Funeral
expense
Rs. 200.
Scholarship on
the basis of
merit.  It varies
from Rs. 50 to
Rs. 1000 per
year  (primary to
professional).
KHED-
LWWF
Pension
scheme not
yet evolved
Every member
will be paid an
amount at the rate
of 10 percent of
total wages
earned during the
entire period of
service.  This is
Ex-gratia benefit
Rs. 2000. Rs.100
per month to
permanently
disabled members
till his death or
lump sum amount
of Rs. 10000.
Education grant-
Rs. 100 per year
per child and
scholarship varies
from Rs. 100 to
Rs. 2000.
KTWWF
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Non-refundable
advance of his
three months
wage or 50% of
his contribution,
whichever is
lower.
For cancer
treatment, he
will be paid
Rs.3000 as
grant (non-
deductible)
Medical     Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special
Maternity  Allowance
Non-
refundable
advance from
his
contribution.
But he
should have
at least
Rs.500  at
the Fund.
Non-
refundable
advance in
case of
unemployment,
provided he
should have
at least Rs.
500 at the
fund.
Refundable
provided he
must have at
least three
month wage
at the Fund.
Members can
withdraw
funds from
his account in
order to pay
the insurance
premium.
Medical grant
(non-deductible)
of Rs. 1,500
(maximum
amount)
No
provision
No provision No provision Tour subsidy
10 ps per k/m
and subsidy
for food and
accomodation
on holiday
home,
Kumali.
Medical grant up
to Rs. 2000 under
medical
reimbursement
scheme.
Interest free loan
of Rs 3000 or
three month
wage whichever
is lower for
marriage
purpose.
Holiday
allowance
of Rs. 30
per day for
seven days
and his
average
wage for
Rs.40000 for
the construc-
tion of a new
house and
Rs10000 for
repairing, as
refundable
advance which
should be
Bonus
payment -
11% of total
wages earned
by the
member
during each
year in
connection
Cont'd.....
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their lump- sum
retirement benefit
or gratuity.  If
there is no much
amount Rs.
10,000 as special
superannuation
assistance is
disbursed,
provided he
should have 100
days of work in
each year.
Under group
insurance
scheme
Rs.20000, if
accident death
occurs.  And
funeral expenses
of Rs. 500.
KMOT-
WWF
  No provision Net amount in the
P.F account and
gratuity paid with
interest (currently
9%) at the time of
superannuation or
on his death.
Ex-gratia benefit
Rs. 5000 and
funeral assistance
Rs1000.
Non-refundable
advance for
education which
should not exceed
Rs. 1200.
Provision for
scholarship.
KADC-
LWF
  No provision At the time of
retirement, he will
be paid according
to his service.  If
he completed 30
years, he will be
paid Rs. 10,000.
Since there is
special provision
for an advance
clerk who is aged
between 35 and
70 years, exgratia
varies from
Rs.1000 (up to 60
years) to Rs 2500
(for 71-75 years)
Funeral assistance
is Rs. 500.
No
provision
Name of Pension      PF, Gratuity etc Disability,      Children’s’
the Fund Death      Education
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two days.
Also, financial
assistance in
connect-ion
with natural
calamity.
repaid within
15 years with
minimum
interest.
with Vishu or
Onam festival.
Also provision
for festival
allowance
(maximum Rs.
2000).
Non-refundable
advance from his
contribution.
An advance
(deductible) of
50% of his
contribution for
marriage
purpose.
Provision for
unemployment
allowance.
Non-
refundable
advance,
which consists
of 12 month
wages and DA
or his own
contribution
with interest,
provided he
must have at
least Rs. 750
at the Fund.
Also, there is
provision for
unemployment
allowance.
No special
schemes.
No provision No provision No provision No provision No special
schemes
Medical     Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special
Maternity  Allowance
Cont'd.....
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KARS-
WWF
No provision Since there is no
provision of P.F
& gratuity, the
net amount at the
Fund (only
membership
contribution)
with interest is
given back at the
time of
retirement or
death.  This
amount varies
from Rs.600 to
Rs. 50,000
depending on
service.
Ex-gratia
Rs.10000,
Disability
allowance Rs.
100 per month,
Funeral
expenses Rs.
500.
Scholarship
ranges from Rs.
300 to
 Rs. 1500
Minimum two
year
membership, 60
years, Rs.100
per month for
ordinary worker
and Rs. 200 per
month under
staff category.
Family pension
in the event of
death of the
pensioner .
Since the Fund
is an Insurance
Fund, No
provision for
P.F, gratuity
and other lump-
sum retirement
benefit
Ex-gratia Rs.2500
under special
consideration like
death, illness or
permanent
disablement.
Funeral expense
of Rs. 500 for a
member and Rs.
250 for pensioner
but it is deductible
from his
contribution.
Scholarship- Rs.
500 to Rs. 2000
per annum.  Cash
award of  Rs.
1000 per student
(only for SSLC
and Pre-degree
students)
KKH-
WWF
Minimum 10
years as a member,
60 years, Rs. 60 to
Rs.180 per month
depending on
service.  If his
service is less than
10 years, he is
eligible to get only
his contribution.
Family pension in
the event of death
of the pensioner at
the same rate.
Since the fund is
an Insurance
Fund, No
provision for
P.F, gratuity
and other lump
sum retirement
benefit
Rs. 5000, if
permanent
disability occurs.
Funeral assistance
Rs. 350.
Non-refundable
advance of Rs.
1500 or 25% of
contribution can be
withdrawn for
higher education.
Education grant
(non-deductible)
Rs.250.
Name of Pension           PF, Gratuity etc Disability,      Children’s’
the Fund Death      Education
KCSH-
WRWF
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Medical aid up to
Rs. 500 (injuries
in the course of
work).
Marriage
assistance of
Rs. 1000 to
any person of
members
family.
Maternity
benefit of Rs.
500 at two
times
(members
only)
No
provision
No provision Loans forpurchasing tools
subject to
maximum
amount of
Rs2000 or 75%
of his
No provision Only maternity
benefit at two
times to those
who are not
covered under
ESI scheme
(Rs. 500)
Supply of
free ration or
payment of
cash
assistance
during
continuous
unemployment
subject to
availability of
the funds.
No special
schemes.
Up to 50% of
contribution for
his or her
dependent for
medical treatment
and also
provision for
maximum medical
grant
Rs. 250.
50% of
contribution as
marriage
assistance to
any member of
the family.
Maternity
benefit of Rs.
300 at two
times
Provision for
non-refundable
advance 25%
of his
contribution for
purchasing land
and 75% for
the construction
of house.
Rs 8 or 50% of
contribution
whichever is
lower for paying
the insurance
premium.
Medical     Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special
Maternity  Allowance
Cont'd.....
52
KCOR-
WWF
Minimum two
year
membership,
60 years, Rs
75 per month
and family
pension in the
event of death
of the
pensioner.
Since the Fund is
an Insurance
Fund, No
provision for P.F,
gratuity and other
lump sum
retirement benefit.
Ex-gratia benefit
Rs. 5000, if
disability occurs.
Rs. 100 per month
till retirement age
(60 years ) and
funeral expense of
Rs. 200.
Scholarship for
higher education-
Rs. 500 to
Rs.1500 per year
on the basis of
merit.
KFMW-
WF
Rs.100 per
month.
Since the Fund is
an Insurance
Fund, No
provision for P.F,
gratuity and other
lump sum
retirement benefit.
Ex-gratia Rs.
15000. Group
insurance covers
accidental death
(Rs. 25000) and
partial disability
(Rs 12500).
Funeral assistance
(member) Rs.
1000 and Rs. 300,
if the person is a
dependent
District wise cash
award for SSLC
students which
ranges from
Rs.3000 to Rs
1000.
KHN
DL-
WWF
Rs. 100 per
month.
Since the fund is
an Insurance
Fund, No
provision for P.F
gratuity and other
lump- sum
retirement benefit
Ex-gratia
Rs. 5000
Non-refundable
advance for
workers children
education
(maximum advance
Rs.1000).
Name of Pension      PF, Gratuity etc Disability,      Children’s’
the Fund Death      Education
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Medical grant of
Rs. 350 per year
to any person in
the  family
.
Grant of
Rs.1000 in
connection
with marriage
and Rs.300 as
maternity
benefit at two
times to those
who not
covered under
ESI scheme.
No provision No provision No special
schemes.
Medical grant up
to Rs.500, if it is
an accident case.
Interest free
loan of Rs.
1200 along
with Rs300
(grant) as
marriage
assistance.
Financial
assistance who
goes for
sterilisation.
Financial
assistance in
case of
natural
calamity like
fish disease,
fire, ban on
trawling.
Provision for
Hut insurance
with 50%
subsidy in
paying
insurance
premium.
Therefore up to
Rs 3000, risk
premium is
Rs.6.75 and up
to Rs.5000, risk
premium Rs
11.25.  Under
craft/cattamaram
insurance
scheme, there is
no subsidy and
the risk
premium is
Rs.22 for every
Rs.100.
Non-refundable
advance not
more than Rs.
500
Non-
refundable
advance of
Rs.2,000 for
marriage
purposes.
Provision
for
unemployment
allowance.
Non-refundable
advance from
housing loan of
12 month
salary or his/
her total
contribution ,
whichever is
lower.
No special
schemes.
Medical     Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special
Maternity  Allowance
Cont'd.....
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KCON-
WWF
KAB
WWF
Minimum
three years,
60 years, Rs.
200 to
Rs.300
(maximum)
per month.
At the time of
retirement a
member is entitled
to obtain only
gratuity as the
retirement benefit
and the net credit
(balance) in the
Provident Fund
account is kept for
financing their
pension scheme.
Ex-gratia Rs. 5000,
Funeral expense
Rs.500.
Scholarship for
higher education
(Pre-degree to
professional
course).
Minimum
one year
member-
ship, 60
years, Rs. 75
per month to
Rs. 300
(maximum)
per month
(depending
on service).
Since the fund
is an Insurance
Fund, No
provision for
P.F, gratuity and
other lump- sum
retirement
benefit.
Ex-gratia Rs.
5000, Funeral
expense Rs. 500.
Non-refundable
advance of Rs.1000
per education
purpose.
Scholarship Rs.
300 to Rs.1200 on
the basis of merit.
KAG-   No provision
WWF
Only lump-sum
retirement
benefit.  If a
member covers
40 years, he is
entitled to Rs.
25,000.  If it is
three years (mini-
mum), he will be
paid Rs. 5,000.
Ex-gratia benefit
Rs 1000.
Scholarship
ranging from
Rs.500 to Rs.
1500.
KLO
TAWF
   No provision Retirement age 60
years and above.
Lump- sum
retirement benefit
depending on his
service.  If he
completed 40
years, he will be
paid Rs. 62,700.
Ex-gratia benefit
for A-class
members Rs.
10000 and B-
class members
Rs.7000.
No
provision
Name of Pension      PF, Gratuity etc Disability,      Children’s’
the Fund Death      Education
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So far no
provision.
No provision Provision for
housing loan
(refundable) of
12 months wages
or his total
contribution,
whichever is
lower provided
he should have at
least Rs 750 in
the Fund.
No special
schemes.
Non-refund-
able advance up
to Rs. 500 will
be provided for
medical
treatment.
Non-refundable
advance of not
more than Rs
2000 from his
contribution.
Grant of
Rs.500 at two
times as
maternity
benefit to
women
workers.
Provision for
housing loan
(refundable)
provided he
should have
three years
membership.
Members can
withdraw the
required
amount to pay
insurence.
So far no
provision
No provision No provision No provision No special
schemes.
So far no
provision.
No provision No provision No provision No special
schemes.
Medical     Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special
Maternity  Allowance
Cont'd.....
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KDSV-
WF
    No provision Retirement age
60 years and
above, lump
sum retirement
benefit
depending on
services.  If he
completed  35
years, he will be
paid Rs. 37,749.
Ex-gratia benefit
for A-class
members
Rs.10,000 and B-
class members
Rs.7,000.
No provision
KAUR-
WWF
   No provision Retirement
benefit
depending on
completed years
of service.
Retirement age
58.  If he
completed 40
years, he will be
paid Rs. 125000
Ex-gratia
Rs10,000 .
Not yet
disbursed.
Source:  Government of Kerala, (1996) Social Security Initiatives  in
Kerala, State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram
Name of Pension         PF, Gratuity etc Disability,      Children’s’
the Fund Death      Education
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So far no
provision.
No provision No provision No provision No special
schemes
Not yet
disbursed.
Marriage
assistance not
yet disbursed.
Provision for
non-
refundable
housing loan
from his
contribution.
Non-refundable
loan for
purchasing
auto-rickshaws.
Medical     Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special
Maternity  Allowance
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